Research Paper

TERRORISM AND CONTAGION THEORY: PROBING THE IMPACT OF ISIS ON BOKO HARAM (2012 – 2014)

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has become a common phenomenon in contemporary global security architecture, earning it an infectious and contagious status in recent years. A better understanding or assessment of this phenomenon could be examining two very active terrorist groups operating in different geographical locations, Boko Haram (B.H.) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). To do this, identifying the influence and communicable effects of terrorism from ISIS on B.H. becomes a predominant factor in this paper. B.H.'s existence has been attributed to economic poverty, mass unemployment, religious ideology, and marginalisation (relative deprivation). However, this study is undertaken to understand whether the B.H. insurgency in Nigeria is a result of these socio-economic and political factors prevalent in the country or imitation of other terrorist groups (contagion/copycat terrorism), such as ISIS. Qualitative analysis of transcripts from both terrorist groups' public statements and their online publications is undertaken with computer-aided analysis software, Nvivo, which shows that both groups have similar aims and objectives, including establishing an Islamic Caliphate with Islamic laws. Although B.H. started as a non-violent group based on the socio-political and economic situations (internal factors) in Nigeria, the group later morphed to imitate the activities, actions, and rhetoric of ISIS, culminating in B.H. developing into the deadliest terrorist group by 2014.

KEYWORDS: Terrorism, Contagion, Boko Haram (B.H.), ISIS, Nvivo Software, Content analysis. Word Count: 6312

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The concept of terrorism has undergone different proposed explanations from the psychological to communal perspectives. To some scholars, it is the use of violence against individuals, groups, and property to coerce individuals and governments to achieve specific objectives with political, social, and religious undertones (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). According to various definitions and theories, the sustenance of terrorism has somewhat been described as a child of contagion, which is "*the exploration of media coverage of terrorist incidents, methods, and most importantly, ideologies as a vector of terrorist infection*" (Nacos, 2009:4). Contagion theory suggests that the coverage of terrorist activities by mass media technologies such as television, internet, newspapers, and other

related means is a source for the imitation and replication of violence for groups prone to such violence (Bjørgo 1997; Weimann & Brosius 1988; Midlarsky et al. 1980). Likewise, Nacos (2009) holds that it is plausible for terrorist groups to perpetrate acts of terror by merely paying attention to other terrorist groups in other countries through the media. Terrorist groups seek to dominate the media space to encourage other groups prone to violence to do the same. Similarly, Grant (2014) posits that terrorist groups take prompts from each other in more ways than one.

It is against this background of the theory of contagion that this paper draws a comparison between the prevalent terrorist group in Nigeria, Boko Haram (referred from here on as B.H.), and the infamous terrorist group operating in Iraq and Syria, known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (referred from here on as ISIS, also known as ISIL/Daesh). This paper examines the extent of probable similarities between the two terrorist groups to determine whether contagion applies in this situation. This will also be done by examining and identifying how the terror activities of ISIS influence the actions of (B.H.) in its terror campaign against the Nigerian State. According to Katja and Brynjar (2004), an increase in terrorist attacks in a particular area is usually shadowed by a rise in terrorist attacks in another area. This suggests that for terrorist groups, the need to orchestrate attacks is largely due to attacks in other geographical locations near or far proximity with identical or dissimilar political and socio-economic structures.

Several theories have been employed to explain the phenomenon that is B.H. in Nigeria, including the psycho-sociological theory, which comprises the relative-deprivation and contagion theories (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). Relative deprivation argues that radical behaviours, such as terrorist activities, are usually a result of frustration due to a denial of particular goals (Borum, 2004). The theory has been cited when viewing the internal structures of States as the main reason for the increase in terrorist attacks (Agbiboa, 2013; Dzuverovic, 2013; Pichette, 2015). In fact, Galtung (1964) argues that a state of disequilibrium from several social and political aspects of life as a result of unmet expectations can induce aggressive behaviours from individuals, while Gurr (2005) recognises that structural inequity in countries results in a breeding ground for radical movements, violence vis-à-vis terrorism. Similarly, Eveslage (2013) applies the theory of relative deprivation to the rise of B.H.activities, arguing that terrorism in Nigeria is due to the country's political, economic, and social construction following the end of the unnatural phenomenon of colonialism and unmet expectations. However, the number of people who do not employ violence to address their grievances is not considered by this theory, which renders it to an extent, not germane for the study of attitudes and behaviours of terrorist groups (Adegbulu, 2013).

It is essential to examine the internal conditions and structures of States which give rise to violence to address grievances rather than through dialogue (Patrick, 2006; Zumve et al, 2013). It has also become increasingly necessary to explore the idea and theory that shows that supposedly successful terrorist activities in one country can lead to the orchestration of similar terrorist activities in another country. In line with contagion theory, Campbell (2014) in his article, 'Nigeria: Five Reasons why Boko Haram's video Matters [sic]' insists that the videos produced by B.H. are of a higher quality, which suggests a collaboration with its former splinter group, Ansaru, and other more sophisticated terrorist groups. What is pertinent here is that the author also indicates that Shekau, the head of B.H. made use of the terminology "Islamic State" to refer to B.H.'s captured territories ('Caliphate') while referring to the terrorist group, 'the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), as the group also sometimes referred to itself as the 'Islamic State' – I.S. as well.

In 2015, B.H. reportedly kidnapped some 238 Chibok schoolgirls, also later using the name, 'the Islamic State West African Province' (ISWAP) after claiming Gwoza, in Borno state in northeastern Nigeria, as its 'Caliphate' in August 2014 (Grant, 2014). A similar move was also undertaken by I.S. earlier in the same year - June 2014 - over swathes of land across Iraq and Syria (Grant, 2014).

Tran and Weaver (2014) also cite similarities between the two terrorist groups, suggesting the imitation of techniques and strategies made popular by mainstream media. It is, therefore, the researcher's aim to delve deep into the media performance, most notably the YouTube propaganda videos produced by these terrorist groups, to apply thematic content analysis to understand the extent of the similarities and influence fully. Thematic content analysis is a commonly used qualitative analytic technique that involves searching for themes or patterns that exist within several contents or communication, in this case, texts and transcripts of terrorist communications (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This will be achieved by applying the benefits of computer-based qualitative analysis tool, NVivo, to select several online produced propaganda material/public speeches to determine keywords, phrases, repetitions, and jihadi rhetoric. The research objective is structured based on the premise mentioned above:

1.1 Research Objective
To understand the contagion that exists between Boko Haram and ISIS.

1.2 Methodology
To answer the Research objective as itemised above, the research methodology, which is the technique through which research is undertaken and how knowledge is acquired (Brown, 2006), uses secondary research and case-study approach while employing content analysis qualitative method (White et al. 2002; Gerring et al., 2008; Bennett and Elman, 2007). Secondary research here involves media sources to assess terrorist groups' (ISISI and B.H.) public statements from 2012 to 2014 and analyses by scholars in journals, books, and articles (Lamont,

2015). This is essential, for as Eveslage (2013) mentioned, public statements, videos and publications represent the means of communication through which prospective members and the rest of the world are sensitized on the activities and ideologies of terrorist groups. Case study research design was chosen for this work because it is useful for testing and applying theories in reality and provides an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon instead of a large study (Lamont, 2015; Shuttleworth, 2008). Content analysis, the study of an extensive variety of 'texts' from transcripts of videos, interviews, written works, and discussions (Neuendorf, 2002), was applied as it uses qualitative approaches (Berg, 2001; Downe-Wambolt, 1992; Krippendorff, 2004), in either an inductive or a deductive way (Bengstssen, 2016; Downe-Wambolt, 1992).

An ISIS' online publication, Dabiq will also be analysed for the year 2014. Although B.H. had no known online periodicals during the period under review, the group's previous video transcript will suffice for analysis using the NVIVO software based on initial research.

For itemising similarities, Celso (2015) suggested the tendencies of 5th wave jihadist terrorist groups to uphold 'takfiri jihadism' based on Kaplan's fifth wave evolution. *'Takfir'* is an 'Arabic word' which is used to describe the ex-communication of a supposed non-Muslim, non-believer, or perceived 'infidel' – unbeliever (Takar & Zahid, 2016). Notablyy, this refers to most Sunni Muslims who accuse other Muslims of apostasy - conversion to another religion (Takar, & Zahid, 2016), while upholding holy war (jihad) against them (Engelkes, 2016). The key components of Jihadist 5th Wave Groups as developed from Jeffrey Kaplan's work and enunciated by Celso (2015: 257) include the following,

1. Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order: The Muslim Community is characterised by *'Jahiliyyah'* (ignorance), made popular by apostate governments and system, which required a withdrawal and rebellion from the current society.
2. Idealisation of a Mythical Past: This requires the need to recreate Muhammad's Medina Communal areas – Caliphate.
3. Brutalisation of Women and Children: Attacks on women such as the restrictions on female education and work engagement and enticing women to marry jihadi fighters. Children are also enticed to join jihadist groups.
4. Unrestrained Violence: The idea of *'Takfir'* promotes the killing of unbelievers, including fellow Sunnis. Continuous military crusade ranging from IEDs, VBIEDs, and ambush of police officers, the military, and civilians.

For a thorough examination of these areas of similarities between B.H. and ISIS, an understanding of B.H.'s background in Nigeria is required.

2.0 BACKGROUND OF BH

Boko Haram is an Islamic militant terrorist group with origins in Nigeria. Etymologically, Boko Haram in Hausa language (Nigeria) is interpreted as *'Boko'* meaning 'Book' referring to 'western culture' and *'Haram,'* being 'forbidden,' 'ungodly,' meaning "the rejection of western culture or education" (Adesoji, 2010: 100; Agbiboa, 2013; Danjibo, 2009: 7; Malasowe, 2016; Marchal, 2012; Walker, 2012). B.H. is the media devised nomenclature for the Islamic terrorist group, *'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunni Lidda' Awati Wal Jihadi'*, meaning 'People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad' (Ajayi, 2012, BBC, 2012; Campbell, 2014; Chothia, 2012; Pham, 2016). The group operates majorly in the principally Muslim northeastern part of Nigeria as well as neighbouring countries, like Cameroon among others, while engaging the military in several battles in Niger, Chad and Benin (Adibe, 2014; Alozieuwa, 2015; Maiangwa, 2014; Mantzikos, 2014; Mamone & Moki, 2015).

The group is believed to have been established in 2002 by Islamist Mohammed Yusuf. However, scholars such as Danyibo (2009) and Ajayi (2012) suggest that the group had existed since 1995, after transforming from a Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state with Abubakar Lawan as its leader (Shola, 2015). The group remained non-militarised until Yusuf took over as a leader in 1999 following Lawan's departure to Saudi Arabia for further studies (Shola, 2015). Following from this, in July 2009, B.H. engaged with the Nigerian army and police after the group attacked a police H.Q. in Potiskum, Yobe state which led to the death of a few B.H. members and the extra-judicial public execution of its then-leader, Yusuf (Ahokegh, 2012; Ajah, 2011; Ajayi, 2012). The group went underground to resurface to become deadlier, orchestrating attacks against the Nigerian populace with Abubakar Shekau as its new leader (Ajayi, 2012; Campbell, 2014; Chothia, 2012; Marchal, 2012; Walker, 2012). B.H. became even more radicalised with global jihadist rhetoric: the rejection of the tenets of democracy, distaste for western education or culture, and government's institutions perceived as corrupt (Ajayi, 2012; Celso, 2015; Murtada, 2013). The group believes that Nigeria is in a state of corruption and the only way out is an outright revolution of and the instilment of Islamic laws and code of conduct (Celso, 2015). This idea was supported by Mohammed Yusuf's BBC interview in 2009 when he mentioned that western education was entwined with Islamic matters (BBC, 2009).

As of 2012, B.H. orchestrated several attacks involving the use of motorbikes, drive-by shooting attacks against police stations and freeing of imprisoned members, kidnapping and killing of politicians, and even Muslims with opposing views (BBC, 2012; Cook, 2014). The year 2011 saw a rise of suicide attacks culminating in the eventual bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja, the Nigerian capital city. Gourley (2012) saw the U.N. building bombing as

signifying an international strategic trajectory and a global outlook taking off the 'clothes' of a local outlook by destroying local media houses and national infrastructures. By the year 2013, terrorist attacks by the group had escalated from northeastern Nigeria to other parts of the country. The year 2014 saw a rise in the deployment of female suicide bombers (Cook, 2014 in Abubakar, 2016), mostly from the abduction of 238 schoolgirls from Chibok, Borno state Nigeria on 14 April 2014 (The Guardian, 2011; BBC, 2011). Moreover, the apparent flawed security system across the Nigerian borders has resulted in the ease in the group's transportation of small arms and light weapons, among other revenue sources, including kidnapping for ransom (Onuoha, 2013).

Within this time, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) following its clash with (President al-Bashir) Assad supporters in Syria under its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2010 (BBC, 2015a). Scholars such as Gourley have attempted to identify similarities and collaboration between B.H. and other terrorist groups, trying to understand how they interact with each other (Gourley, 2012). At this juncture, it will be useful also to provide a background on ISIS.

2.1 Background of ISIS

The term *'ISIS'* is an acronym for the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' or '*Daesh*' - a derogatory term transcribed from the Arabic language to mean 'one who crushes something underfoot' or 'one who sows discord' (Irshaid, 2015; Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017; Khan, 2016). ISIS is a terrorist group that has perpetrated acts of terrorism across the world (Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017; Khan, 2016). As a Salafist jihadist group, ISIS gained recognition in 2014 when it annexed swathes of land in Syria and Iraq and dubbed it a Caliphate, while also involved in mass casualty bombings, killings, and beheadings (BBC, 2015b). A '*Caliphate'* represents an Islamic or Sharia law governed territory headed by a Caliph (Islamic leader) - Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for ISIS (BBC, 2015b).

The group has an international outlook. It has requested other terrorist groups to pledge allegiance to it and migrate to its controlled territories while beckoning different cadre and professionals to migrate to its supposed Caliphate. (Allison, 2014; BBC, 2015a; BBC, 2016; Gambhir, 2014; Pham, 2016; The Bay'ah from West Africa, n.d). ISIS accepted B.H.'s formal pledging of allegiance in the group's 2015 video (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasy, 2015; Elbagir et al., 2015; Osley, 2015). Laccino (2015) views the allegiance by B.H. as a move by the group to distance itself from the increased news of successful anti-terrorism efforts and victories by the regional task force intended to limit its activities. The act is perceived as a move to boost the group's followers' morale and furnish them with the idea that the group was still relevant and formidable by looking more international. Moreover, it could also serve as a vehicle for vying for financial aid and ammunition owing status, to pressures from the regional offensive (David Otto, 2015 in Laccino, 2015).

ISIS links its origin to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who pledged his allegiance to Osama Bin Laden, the late al Qaeda leader, following the U.S. Iraqi invasion in 2003 (BBC, 2015b; Laub and Masters, 2014; Kemp, 2016). This resulted in the formation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), leading to the 'Islamic State of Iraq' (ISI) being birthed in 2006. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi became the leader until he died in 2010, then a former U.S. detainee, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, became the ISI new leader in the same year (Kfrir, 2015). From 2011 through to 2013, ISI became militarily more active in Iraq, forming the Jabhat al-Nusra Front with Abu Muhammad al Jawlani as its head (Abubakar, 2016), while gaining grounds in Syria and eventually joining in the uprising and rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad's regime (Abubakar, 2016; BBC, 2015b). Leadership preferences and differences led to a falling out between the al-Nusra Front and the ISI (Abubakar, 2016). In 2013, Baghdadi created the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) by unifying the Iraqi and Syrian forces. ISIL/ISIS eventually focused its attention on Iraq, taking control of Fallujah, a central Iraqi city - the group's 'Caliphate' was created. Following the annexation of the Northern city of Mosul and other towns and cities, a change of name was made by the group to 'Islamic State' in June 2014 (BBC, 2015b, Fishman, 2014).

The group is against the Shi'ite led Iraqi government accusing the government of being too westernised and corrupt (Abubakar, 2016). Furthermore, ISIS is against the Iraqi and Syrian territorial boundaries, which it perceives as a clandestine plan to impose the Alawites, a minority group, as a ruling class in Syria with a weakened Sunni presence (Burke, 2013; Kfrir, 2015; Polk, 2013; Wood, 2015). Other factors have given credence to the rise of ISIS as articulated by Hashim (2014 in Abubakar, 2016), ranging from the administration of ISIS by Al-Baghdadi to the Syrian conflict and the eventual break away from al Qaeda. The group has continued to amass territories and wreak havoc globally while claiming responsibilities for suicide bombings and attacks as they occurred (Asfura-heim and Macquaid, 2015). Moving in similar styles and tactics towed by B.H., ISIS focuses on using religion, violence and 'territorial acquisition' as an avenue for political transformation, unlike former terrorist groups such as al Qaeda (Abubakar, 2016; Asfura-heim and Macquaid, 2015).

Territories under ISIS control have been faced with a strict interpretation of Sharia law. Women have to be fully covered, and executions have a ubiquitous place in the territories' lifestyle (BBC, 2015b). Non-Muslims are expected to pay special taxes, netting almost US$8 million monthly (Laub and Masters, 2014), or risk death (BBC, 2015b; Kemp, 2016; Wood, 2015). ISIS trails the line of al-Zarqawi, which emphasises the glorification of harsh and stringent Islamic laws and the recruitment of young fighters based on the idea of Sunnis' liberation being persecuted in Iraq Syria (Kemp, 2016; Kfir, 2015; Wood, 2015). To accurately apply the contagion theory, an understanding of the theory would be useful.

3.0 CONTAGION THEORY

A theory is a set of ideas used to clarify and appreciate phenomena (Abend, 2008), which can also be used to argue and increase current knowledge regarding the boundaries of already given standards and the reasons for the existence of the problem under investigation (Abend, 2008; Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016; Swanson, 2013). Several theories have been used to explain the phenomenon of terrorism in Nigeria and B.H., such as the relative deprivation theory (frustration-aggression) among others, the contagion theory is employed to look into the external influences on the terrorist group in Nigeria.

Essentially, contagion theory, which is applied and tested in this paper, suggests that terrorist tactics in one country lead to and inspire terrorism in a similar or different country (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). While looking at it from a terrorist group perspective, it suggests that terrorist groups imitate one another (or other more successful groups). Therefore, terrorism is perceived as a behaviour that can transcend borders to affect violence-prone individuals to pick up arms and fight for the cause of other similar or dissimilar groups, whose point of views are being shared across the world on diverse media platforms (Weimann & Brosius 1988; Redlick 1979; Midlarsky et al. 1980).

The spread of terrorism by contagion is believed to be increased by globalisation, which is the procedure and practice by which the world is becoming interconnected owing to improved trade and cultural interchange and transfer (BBC n.d). Globalisation is perceived to have ushered in its wake, new technologies employed by terrorist groups to achieve their aims and objectives (Cooper, 2001). The mass media, how people are provided with information about happenings through mediums, such as the internet and smartphones (Mass media, 2000), has become according to Martin (2013: 370), *"a weapon of war"* in the hands of terrorists providing a lucrative addition to their weaponry. He advocates that images and symbols are relatively manipulated to influence governments and societies.

Furthermore, Hoffman (1998) reiterated that the rise of innovative communication technologies, making it easier for news dissemination and the constant rivalry among news outlets (regarding who breaks the news first) have been capitalised upon by terrorist groups to their advantage as they seek media airtime for the promotion of their cause. For example, B.H. has used different means to convey its messages to the public, such as being involved in "*directly speaking to the press or (having) pre-recorded videos (which) have been the most common messaging types*" (Mahmood, 2017: 4). Additionally, various newspapers have covered the group's messages to different levels even as far as the group having frequent access to reporters from certain newspaper outlets such as The Daily Trust (Mahmood, 2017).

Moreover, Crenshaw (1990) adds that as more people get used to the effect/impact of terrorism, there is always a need to go over and beyond on the part of terrorist groups to shock their already increasing audience to seek more international credit or be regarded as 'the best in the game', resulting in more deadly attacks resulting in mass casualty. A case in point was in the year 2014 when B.H. surpassed ISIS as the most deadly terrorist group in the world, responsible for 6,644 deaths compared to ISIS, which was believed to have killed 6,073 people during the same period (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).

However, researchers such as Ajayi (2012) and Akinwalere (2013) agree that the media has a pivotal role in sensitising their audiences on the ills of terrorism to society rather than simply reporting, gratifying, or abruptly dismissing the actions of any select group. Though they still understand that there are various limitations to media outlets' efforts in the achievement of this feat.

Still on contagion, Kennedy Moorhead captured the effect of communication between terrorist groups when he enunciated that certain groups, "*find ways to communicate and bond ... to the extent that there is little hope for amelioration of (the) situation, (hence) terrorism on a wider scale becomes increasingly possible in the next century*" (Kennedy, 1998: 190). Crenshaw (1983) sustained the viewpoint that ideas that encourage terrorism are transmitted beyond countries' borders via telecommunication technologies.

4.0 ANALYSIS AND FINDING

After a collation and analyses from both terrorist groups, B.H. and ISIS, following from the scope and time-bound research, five of B.H.'s videos were found to have been transcribed online in 2012, one in 2013, and five in 2014, with no online publication in the form of periodicals from the group. There were only two transcripts available for ISIS in the year 2014 and five online publications (Dabiq) for which the first five were analysed, coded, and illustrated through the Nvivo qualitative analysis software.

The figures that follow represent nodes (themes), coded and extrapolated from the qualitative analysis software. The *'ball'* (in some instances in the centre) represents the themes being coded while the page like figures at the end of the arrows represent the transcripts from which the themes were found [identified] and coded. The transcripts coded are as follows:

Boko Haram: 2012 BH transcript, 2013 BH transcript, 2014 BH transcript.

ISIS: 2014 ISIS transcript

Dabiq transcripts: 01 Dabiq-no.01-July-2014 (Issue 1), 02 Dabiq-no.02-July-2014 (Issue 2), 03 Dabiq-no.03-Aug-2014 (Issue 3), 04 Dabiq-no.04-Oct-2014 (Issue 4), 05 Dabiq-no.05-Nov-2014 (Issue 5).

4.1 Illustrations of Units of Analysis by NVivo Software analysis
4.1.1 Coding Analysis for the Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order

The theme of rejection of existing social-political order, which refers to the idea that the Muslim Community is void of morality and is fundamentally in a state of ignorance (*Jahiliyyah*) and should be separated from the society as proposed by Celso (2015), is illustrated in **Figure 1**, and coded along with all the transcripts from B.H. to ISIS (including ISIS Dabiq online publications). This showed the largest similarity between B.H. and ISIS as of 2014.

Figure 1: Coding Analysis for the Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order

Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The idea of contagion, which exists as imitating the actions of ISIS: B.H.'s leader, Shekau in 2014 citing his status and the need for the rejection of the existing socio-political system in Nigeria was quoted as saying:

"*This is from Allah on the need for us to break down infidels, practitioners of democracy, and constitutionalism, voodoo and those that are doing Western education in which they are practicing paganism.*

"*If you say, "I pledge to Nigeria my country," it is wrong and (an) act of paganism. For me, I pledge to Allah my God, to be faithful to my Allah and you to your country. I to my Allah, I pledge to my Allah to be faithful, loyal and honest to serve Allah. Are you saying what? Toserve Nigeria? To Serve Allah? Loyal and honest to serve Allah? That is what I will say; this is what you are saying in your reading of Western education. With all your strength you said you will worship a land, this is what you people said.*" (Abubakar Shekau, 2014: Nigerian Bulletin, 2014).

Here, Shekau blatantly rejected the tenets of democracy, as a sign of patriotism and the Nigerian constitution, which remains the binding *'grand norm'* of the country (Sahara Reporters, 2010). He further mocked Nigeria's National Pledge, which reiterates the need to serve the country (Fatherland), referring to the constitution and its tenets as the source of all paganism, or infidelity from Western education. Similarly, ISIS in its August 2014 Dabiq publication, titled 'A Call to *Hijrah* (emigration),' also called for the disruption of (Western education) by Muslims when it wrote that:

"*As for the Muslim students who use this … pretense [sic] now to continue abandoning the obligation of the era, then they should know that their hijrah (emigration) from dārul-kufr to dārul-Islām and jihād are more obligatory and urgent then [sic] spending an unknown number of years studying while exposed to doubts and desires that will destroy their religion and thus end for themselves any possible future of jihād*" (Dabiq August 2014: 26).

A different trajectory is also seen in B.H. version 3.0 of 2014 as encapsulated by Pham (2016), following foreign links with terrorist groups such as ISIS which saw a more lethal terrorist group from version 1.0, which was largely about peaceful protests and riots and trying to make the world understand their stand (Friedman, 2012). This is buttressed in B.H's transcript from 2012. Shekau tries to explain the group's stance, insisting that the group was solely against security service agents such as the police following the execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, and capture of its women. This is in addition to the group's denial of death or attacks ascribed to the group by the Nigerian government or security forces (Ahokegh, 2012; Walker, 2012). Shekau claimed in a 2012 speech that:

"We have stopped everything apart from saying we should stay on the path of truth and peace and live right in the sight of God. There, we will have peace, and that is what we have been preaching and [because] of that they said we should be killed and our mosques destroyed. We decided to defend ourselves and God has said if (you) follow him, he will give you strength… Our objective is not to kill or humiliate or steal…However, responsibility for the killing of 150 people was denied as made up by the Nigerian [government]. We never kill ordinary people, rather we protect them. It is the army that rushed to the press to say we are the ones killing civilians. We are not fighting civilians. We only kill soldiers, police and other security agencies," (Abubakar Shekau, 2012: Mark, 2012; Oboh, 2012).

According to B.H., as of 2012, they only harmed security agencies and did not intend to hurt civilians while denying some allegations by the government that the group had killed some people. However, this soon changed as B.H. began targeting different segments of society to make their point clear (Pham, 2016).

4.1.2 Coding Analysis for the Idealisation of a Mythical Past

The next theme refers to 'The Idealisation of Mythical Past' illustrated in **Figure 2**. It denotes the restoration of Muhammad's Medina Community and the Caliphate (Celso, 2015). It was mostly existent in B.H. transcripts from 2012 and 2014, ISIS 2014 transcript and Dabiq online transcripts published in July, October, and November 2014.

Figure 2: Coding Analysis for the Idealisation of a Mythical Past

Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

This is evident such as when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, while calling for a global '*hijrah' (emigration) in 2014,* posited that:

"The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory." (*Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 2014* (Jihadist News, 2014).

Here, he sees the swathes of acquired territory as a Caliphate belonging to Muslims referred to as *'Medina'* attributed to Prophet Muhammad in 622 (BBC, 2011, PBS, 2002).

It is compelling as a contagion that this sort of rhetoric was imitated by B.H. leading to the pledging of allegiance by B.H. to ISIS in a video in March 2015 and the latter reportedly accepting the allegiance (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasy, 2015; Elbagir et al., 2015; Osley, 2015). Moreover, the creation of the Caliphate by ISIS in June 2014 over swathes of land across Iraq and Syria was also replicated by B.H. in August 2014 when the group annexed Gwoza in Borno state in North-eastern Nigeria as its Caliphate (Grant, 2014). B.H. officially dubbed itself 'the Islamic State West African Province' (ISWAP) after its Caliphate establishment (Pham, 2016).

The contagion between both groups can also be found in their reactions to and treatment of women.

4.1.3 Coding Analysis for Kidnapping and Brutalization of Women and Children

Regarding B.H. and ISIS treatment of women, the 'kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children' as depicted in **Figure 3**, has been a recurring decimal in both groups (Pham, 2016).

Figure 3: Coding Analysis for Kidnapping and Brutalization of Women and Children

Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The theme was coded in 2012 and 2013, but more pronounced in 2014 from the B.H. transcripts, July and October editions of 2014 ISIS Dabiq publications. B.H. has been involved in the sale of girls and women into slavery (BBC, 2014) and youths' recruitment into their ranks with ISIS referring B.H. regarding the group's treatment of Chibok girls (Gambhir, 2014).

Before 2012, as earlier noted, B.H. was more interested in explaining to news agencies why they were not targeting civilians and just attacking security personnel. However, in 2014 following the declaration of the activities of the I.S. in Iraq and Syria, B.H. out rightly declared its sale in women (Pham, 2016). In the ISIS October 2014 Dabiq publication, the group made mention of B.H.'s kidnapping of the Chibok girls as synonymous with its (ISIS) exploitation and sexual assault of Iraqi Yazidi women (Pham, 2016). The group also spoke about the B.H.'s allegiance stating that most Christians in the area were being subjected and subjugated to the terrorist group's rule (The Bay'ah from West Africa, n.d; Pham, 2016). ISIS made this clear in its fourth Dabiq publication, saying: *"This large-scale enslavement of mushrik families is probably the first since the abandonment of this Sharī'ah law. The only other known case – albeit much smaller – is that of the enslavement of Christian women and children in … Nigeria by the mujāhidīn there"* referring to B.H. (Dabiq October 2014: 15). *Here, it can be seen that the actions of B.H. in the maltreatment of Christian women and children was highly commended by ISIS.*

This can also be related to the level of violence perpetrated by B.H., which saw a drastic change from 2012 to 2014. This will be explained in the next coding analysis.

4.1.4 Coding Analysis for Unrestrained Violence

The theme of 'Unrestrained violence' as depicted in **Figure 4** was relevant to the change in B.H. tactics and imitation of the activities of ISIS. The year 2014 saw B.H. become the deadliest terrorist group, with a total of 5,049 more kills than in 2013 totaling up to 6,644 kills with ISIL/ISIS falling behind with 4,672 more kills than the previous year and having a total of 6,073 kills in 2014 (IEP, 2015: 38, 41). There was unrestrained violence involving attacks against military formations, suicide bombings against soldiers and civilians alike, and fellow Muslims with a different non-extremist approach or ideology, including fellow un-yielding Sunnis (Celso, 2015).

Figure 4: Coding Analysis for Unrestrained Violence

Source: NVivo Software Analysis (2018)

The theme was coded in four of the Dabiq publications in 2014 with both publications in July, and others in October and November and 2014 ISIS transcript. B.H. transcripts for the year 2012 were found to have the theme of unrestrained violence, but it was more pronounced in the year 2014. ISIS began a campaign to use destruction and 'unrestrained violence' throughout 2014 as stipulated and advertised in its Dabiq publications and speeches (Gambhir, 2014). B.H. also proclaimed unrestrained violence against all and sundry, Christians, including Muslims, opposed their doctrine and way of Islamic interpretation (Pham, 2016; Walker, 2012). Here, Shekau in a speech is quoted as saying:

"All those clerics are to be killed for following democracy, all of them are infidels. I will tell Muslims what Allah wants them to do. We are anti-Christians, and those that deviated from Islam, they are forming basis with prayers but infidels"
(CKN, 2014; Peace, 2014).

Additionally, the increased need for B.H. to claim responsibility for attacks was another code in this research. Nonetheless, this and other codes were not discussed or included in this paper for brevity and further research on the topic.

CONCLUSION

Nigerians have known B.H. since 2002, but the group started its military campaign in 2009 following the death of its then founder, Mohammed Yusuf, in the hands of police officers in July 2009 (Ahokegh, 2012; Ajah, 2011; Ajayi, 2012). Using the theory of relative deprivation, Idahosa (2015) suggests that the rise of Boko Haram results from the poor socio-economic conditions in northeastern Nigeria, further exacerbated by the government's inability to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants of the region. The expansion of ISIS in 2014 was employed to explain the sustenance of B.H. in Nigeria through the application of Contagion theory. Under Contagion theory, according to Katja and Brynjar (2004), an increase in terrorist attacks in a particular period is usually shadowed by the rise in terrorist attacks in the next period, suggesting that the need to orchestrate attacks is a result of attacks in other geographical areas. This surpasses political and socio-economic structures, as explained by relative deprivation.

However, it could be suggested, as Muzan (2014) advocated, that though B.H. might have started based on ethnocentric debates and fighting for the struggles of northern Nigeria, the subsequent need for the creation of an Islamic Caliphate and extremist views became glaring and similar to that of ISIS, which Pham (2016), referred to as

BH 4.0 with discernible consequences.

In similar terms, while the emergence of B.H. can be attributed to the failed internal structures and the poor socio-economic conditions of Northeastern Nigeria, as surmised by scholars such as Agbiboa, Dzuverovic and Pichette by applying the theory of relative deprivation (Agbiboa, 2013; Dzuverovic, 2013, Pichette, 2015); the sustenance and increase in violence orchestrated by B.H. can be attributed to the group's contagion and imitation of the activities of ISIS. As such, the sustenance of terrorism by B.H. in Nigeria can be traced to ISIS following from Celso's (2015) description of the 5th wave jihadist groups, which include the rejection of Existing Social-Political Order as was seen in the constant calling for the rejection of Western education, the idealisation of a mythical past, with B.H. creating its Caliphate in North-eastern Nigeria in August 2014, few months after ISIS established its Caliphate in June 2014 over swathes of land across Iraq and Syria. This is further exacerbated by B.H. officially dubbing itself 'the Islamic State West African Province' (ISWAP), with group splitting into two factions of B.H. and ISWAP and a change in leadership (Zenn, 2018).

However, the extent of ISIS' influence on B.H. will continually be a subject of research to understand the Nigerian group's sustenance. Moreover, the brutalisation of women and children and unrestrained violence can also be perceived from B.H. as ISIS also continues to speak about B.H. in Nigeria praising its efforts and activities and even comparing its treatment of the Chibok girls and commenting on selling them, to their treatment of Yazidi women (Pham, 2016; The Bay'ah from West Africa, n.d). The continued sustenance of violence on the part of B.H. and imitation of the activities of ISIS led to the former becoming the most deadly terrorist group in the year 2014 with 6,644 deaths, and ISIS recording a total of 6,073 deaths in 2014 (IEP, 2015: 38, 41).

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